We define reactive simulatability for general asynchronous systems. Roughly, simulatability means that a real system implements an ideal system (specification) in a way that preserves security in a general cryptographic sense. Reactive means that the system can interact with its users multiple times, e.g., in many concurrent protocol runs or a multiround game. In terms of distributed systems, reactive simulatability is a type of refinement that preserves particularly strong properties, in particular confidentiality. A core feature of reactive simulatability is composability, i.e., the real system can be plugged in instead of the ideal system within arbitrary larger systems; this is shown in follow-up papers, and so is the preservation of many classes of individual security properties from the ideal to the real systems.
Introduction
In this paper we present the reactive simulatability (RSIM) framework for general asynchronous systems. More precisely, we present the definition of reactive simulatability and a general reactive asynchronous system model as a basis for this definition and many other general security definitions and theorems.
The Idea of Reactive Simulatability
The basic idea of reactive simulatability, sometimes abbreviated as RSIM, is to define under what conditions one system, typically a real cryptographic system, securely implements another system, typically a much simpler specification called ideal system. Roughly, we define that this is true if everything that can happen to the honest users of the real system, with strong real adversaries, can also happen to the same honest users if they use the ideal system, where adversaries do not occur or at least have far less power. What happens to the users includes the aspect of the adversary's knowledge about the users' behavior and secrets.
Definitions of a real system implementing a specification are well-known in the field of distributed systems and often called refinement; however, normal refinement does not retain confidentiality properties and is therefore not suitable for most security systems, in particular for most cryptographic systems and protocols. For instance, if one defines an ideal secure channel essentially as a black box where messages are put in on one side and come out on the other side, normal notions of correct implementation by a distributed system allow that intermediate parties learn the messages. For security and cryptography, however, this should not happen if the ideal secure channel gives no information to such parties.
In cryptography, a suitable notion of secure implementation, typically called simulatability, was already defined for ideal systems (specifications) that are just functions: each party makes one input at the beginning and obtains one output at the end. Essentially, we extend this notion to reactive systems, i.e., systems where parties may make inputs and obtain outputs at many different times. Examples of reactive cryptographic systems are multi-round auctions, protocols with many concurrent sessions, and untraceable electronic cash systems because whether a payment succeeds depends on prior cash withdrawal actions. For all these systems one requires confidentiality properties, so that the relation between a real system and a specification cannot only be the classical refinement of distributed systems. Reactive simulatability makes the realand-ideal system specification technique available for such types of systems.
An important property of reactive simulatability is composability. Roughly this means that a larger system can be defined based on the specification of a subsystem, in other words with an ideal subsystem, and then the real subsystem can be plugged in instead without causing any significant difference. The notion of "no significant difference" is again reactive simulatability. Composability is generally required of refinement relations in distributed systems. The idea of reactive simulatability has also become known as universal composability (UC) for such properties. (We describe the history of these terms and theorems in Section 1.7.) Reactive simulatability also offers property preservation, i.e., if one proves certain important properties of an ideal system, then they also hold for the real system. An example of such a property is that the participants in a payment system cannot spend more money than they put in initially or received. Such properties are not always trivial to show for an ideal system, but usually very much easier than if one had to do it directly for the real system. However, for length reasons of this first journal version with detailed definitions, we do not prove any composition and property preservation theorems here although the first ones were in the corresponding conference publication.
Link to Formal Methods and Tool-Supported Proofs
As just explained, reactive simulatability with its notion of ideal systems is an important new way of specifying reactive cryptographic systems and protocols, besides the classical way of defining many individual properties, where each property immediately contains details about adversaries, polynomial-time considerations, and error probabilities.
Besides this general motivation, a specific motivation for defining reactive simulatability was that it offers an important link between cryptography and formal methods, in particular automated proof tools such as model checkers and theorem provers. Interest in such a link can be justified from both prior cryptographic protocol proofs and from prior tool-supported proofs of security protocols: The cryptographic motivation is essentially the limit of human stamina when dealing with the many different sequences of actions occurring in executions of even relatively small protocols. The tool-supported proof motivation is the prior lack of demonstrated soundness with respect to real cryptography. We now discuss this in more detail.
Typical cryptographic proofs are reductions between the security of an overall system under consideration and the security of the cryptographic primitives used: One shows that if one could break the overall system, one could also break one of the primitives with respect to its cryptographic definition, e.g., adaptive chosen-message security for signature schemes. In principle, these proofs are as rigorous as typical proofs in mathematics. In practice, however, human beings are extremely fallible with such proofs when protocols are concerned. This is mainly due to the distributed-systems aspects of the protocols. It is well-known from noncryptographic distributed systems that many wrong protocols have been published even for very small problems. Hand-made proofs are highly error-prone because following all the different orders of interleaving of the actions of different participants is extremely tedious. Humans tend to take wrong shortcuts and do not want to proof-read such details in proofs by others. If the protocol contains cryptography, the situation is even worse: Already a rigorous definition of the goals and of the protocol itself gets more complicated, and there was previously no general framework for this. Compared with protocol proofs outside security, which are mostly for trace properties, i.e., properties of individual runs, confidentiality properties are more complex because they are properties of entire probability spaces of runs. Moreover, in principle the complexity-theoretic reduction has to be carried out across all the different interleavings, and it is not at all trivial to do this rigorously. In consequence, there are very few real cryptographic proofs of larger protocols, and several times supposedly proven, relatively small systems were later broken. Hence tool support should be very welcome, at least for the tedious distributedsystem aspects.
In fact, work on tool-supported proofs of cryptographic protocols started as early as work on computational cryptographic definitions and proofs. Tools mean model checkers and automatic theorem provers; initially mostly special-purpose for security protocols, nowadays mostly specializations of more general tools. However, for a very long time all these proofs were based on idealized abstractions of cryptographic primitives, almost always by representing cryptographic operations as operators of a term algebra with cancellation rules, so-called Dolev-Yao models. For instance, public-key encryption is represented by operators E for encryption and D for decryption with one cancellation rule, D(E(m)) = m for all m. Encrypting a message m twice in a Dolev-Yao model does not yield another message from the basic message space but the term E(E(m)). The models assume that two terms whose equality cannot be derived with the cancellation rules are not equal, and every term that cannot be derived is completely secret. This simplifies proofs of larger protocols considerably. However, originally there was no foundation at all for such idealizations of cryptographic primitives, and thus no guarantee that protocols proved with these tools are secure when implemented with real cryptography. Although no previously proved protocol has been broken when implemented with standard provably secure cryptosystems (if one excludes proofs in formal models that have more semantic problems than the cryptographic ones, in particular those based on logics of belief because of the typically unjustified monotonicity of belief, and only regards the properties that were proved), this was clearly an unsatisfactory situation, and artificial counterexamples can be constructed.
The main use of reactive simulatability in the context of linking cryptography and formal methods in a sound way is that it can be the gauge for deciding whether an idealization is securely realized by a specific cryptographic implementation, or even realizable by any such implementation. One specific goal, achieved later, was to apply this gauge to Dolev-Yao models. However, the approach is not at all limited to Dolev-Yao models -many possible ideal systems used as specifications for cryptographic systems are quite simple and can thus be encoded into existing proof tools, so that those proof tools can be used when larger systems are proved that use these cryptographic systems.
Requirements on the System Model
The first obstacle to defining reactive simulatability was that there was no system model, i.e., a model of protocol participants and how they interact, that combined all the features we desire:
• Allowing reactive systems.
• Enabling system definitions that are not encumbered by Turing machine details, in particular for ideal systems and with the aim of encodings into some current proof tools.
• Allowing run-time considerations, because most cryptographic systems are only secure against computationally bounded adversaries. We also desire composability of runtimes; in particular the combination of polynomial-time entities should be polynomial again. This is particularly important in compositions, where the protocol machines of higher layers become the users of the lower-layer systems. Users also have to be polynomially bounded so that an adversary cannot offload computations to them in active attacks.
• Asynchronous systems with a sufficiently flexible scheduling model that all typical cases can be represented. A scheduling model defines how it is determined in which order different actions, in particular of different distributed entities, occur. In particular, we want to allow:
-scheduling by the adversary with realistic information;
-procedure-call-style scheduling for colocated components; this occurs in particular in compositions, when a higher-layer entity uses a lower-layer entity in the same location; and -restricted scheduling, e.g., fair schedulers for liveness-style considerations (i.e., requirements that something should happen, possibly within restricted time), or for encoding synchronous systems.
• Independence of trust models. This means that the core system model should not fix issues like what computational power an adversary has, how it can corrupt participants, and how it can manipulate messages on channels. There are many variants of this, and we want to be able to express them all.
We address the last requirement by first defining a core system model without any security considerations, i.e., an extension of existing distributed-system models by more generic scheduling and by runtime considerations. Then we specialize this with a small number of general security concepts such as the notion of an adversary and an honest user. Finally, we define some specific examples of trust models, mainly for real systems, in particular for static and dynamic adversaries and for channels with different types of security. These layers and the main definitions we make on each layer are surveyed in Figure 1 . The first four requirement above all refer to the lowest layer. Some details of these requirements may become clearer when we explain how we address them.
Asynchronous System Model with General Distributed Scheduling and Runtimes
We use an IO automata model as our core model, in other words state-transitions systems that specify the next output and state for every given input and state. Given the importance of probabilism in cryptography we need probabilistic IO automata (PIOAs). We did not choose interactive Turing machines as the core model, although this was normal at that time in cryptography, because of our requirement that ideal systems, if they are simple in principle, should be easy to encode into existing proof tools from our concrete specification. IO automata are the typical basis for encoding distributed systems into the specification languages of standard theorem provers. Furthermore, most formal languages (i.e., with fully fixed syntax) for distributed systems have some state-transition system as their semantics. Informally also cryptography has often used IO automata, because nobody actually specifies cryptographic protocols as Turing machines; the specifications in articles are much closer to IO automata as soon as they go beyond simple arrow pictures. One novelty is that we allow essentially arbitrary scheduling schemes. The basis of scheduling is message delivery: In an asynchronous system, a message does not arrive immediately at its recipient, but may be held up in the network. In our generic distributed scheduling, one can designate for each connection which party decides about the arrival of the messages on this connection; we call this party the scheduler of this connection. Thus in particular we can model the special cases required above:
• We can let the adversary schedule everything by making it the scheduler of all connections.
• For procedure-call style interactions between a colocated caller and a service, we let the caller schedule the connection to the service, and let the service schedule the reverse connection. Each of them immediately schedules each of its messages on these connections.
• Or a separate scheduler can schedule everything, or only certain connections (e.g., secure ones) while the adversary schedules others.
While the generic distributed scheduling allows many more variants, these three (in particular combinations of the first and the second) are mostly used in subsequent work. For computational complexity, the easiest option would be to consider the complexity of the state-transition function of the IO automata. The complexity of functions is well-defined and we would never need to mention the underlying bit-level model like Turing machines, in particular if we concentrate on notions like polynomial-time that are robust against small model variations. However, polynomial-time transitions do not even lead to overall polynomial runtime when such a machine runs essentially alone: For instance, such a machine might double the size of its current state in each transition; thus it can use time exponential in its initial state size after a linear number of transitions with one-bit inputs. In a medium notion, which we call weakly polynomial-time, the runtime of the machine is polynomial in the overall length of its inputs and its initial state. A weakly polynomial-time machine is a permissible adversary when interacting with a cryptographic system which is in itself polynomially bounded; i.e., this seems to be the weakest useful definition. However, this notion does not compose: Several weakly polynomial-time machines together can become too powerful. E.g., each new output may be twice as long as the inputs so far. Then with a linear number of interactions, these machines can use time exponential in the size of their initial states.
Hence we define polynomial-time machines as those that only need time polynomial in their initial state size, independent of all inputs. This notion is composable.
We nevertheless use weakly polynomial-time machines sometimes, because many functionalities are naturally weakly polynomial-time and not naturally polynomial-time.
We made one further addition to individual machines compared with other I/O automata models, in order to enable machines to have polynomial runtime independent of their environment without being automatically vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks by long messages: We allow state-dependent length bounds on the inputs that a machine will read from each channel.
Security-Related System Model
Reactive simulatability is about systems, users, and adversaries: If the same honest users use either the real or the ideal system, they shouldn't notice a difference, even though the real system typically gives an adversary much more power than the ideal system. Hence we have to define users and adversaries. The general system model sketched in Section 1.4 simply allows "open" systems that can interact with some environment. The user-adversary distinction is essential but quite simple: We split the interaction opportunities (later called ports; also think of them as unattached connections) into some for the honest users and others for the adversary. We call the former service ports. We call such an open system with a split into service ports and others a structure, and if we augment it by an honest user and an adversary in the designated way, we call it a configuration.
We also define systems as sets of structures; this is the general provision for trust models which allow that instead of one structure intended by a designer (e.g., with n machines for n users, connected by point-to-point channels), one of many different semi-corrupted structures is actually present (e.g., with fewer machines because some were taken over by the adversary, and with wiretaps on the channels). 
Reactive Simulatability Variants
We have already introduced reactive simulatability, the main goal of our definitions, in Section 1.1. Figure 2 illustrates it, including typical identifiers that we use for various parts. The left half illustrates a real system. Here it consists of a structure with only two machines (PIOAs) M 1 and M 2 . An entirety of honest users H uses it via the service ports, and an adversary A interacts both with the two "normal" machines and the honest users. This is compared with the ideal system on the right side. In this example, the structure in the ideal system consists of just one machine, which we often call TH for "trusted host" (corresponding to the intuition that a trusted host would simply do for the participants what in reality they have to do via a complex cryptographic protocol). Formally there is no difference between ideal and real systems in our model; this is useful in compositions and other multi-part security proofs. The same honest users use the ideal structure via the same service ports, and there may again be an adversary A ′ . We define reactive simulatability in several variants: In one dimension, we vary the order of quantifiers in the statement that for all honest users H and all adversaries A on the real system, there should be an adversary A ′ on the ideal system that achieves the same effects. What we just wrote is general reactive simulatability (GRSIM). If the ideal adversary does not depend on the honest users (only on the real adversary and of course the system), we speak of universal reactive simulatability (URSIM), i.e., then the quantifier order is ∀A∃A ′ ∀H. If the ideal adversary consists of a fixed part that uses the real adversary as a blackbox, we speak of blackbox reactive simulatability (BRSIM) and call the fixed part simulator. In another dimension, we have a perfect, a statistical, and a computational variant, depending on computational restrictions and the degree of similarity we require between the real and the ideal system.
Prior Work
Simulatability, i.e., the notion of using a simple ideal system as a specification for a cryptographic system, was first sketched for secure multi-party function evaluation, i.e., for the computation of one output tuple from one tuple of secret inputs from each participant, in [99] . It was defined (with different degrees of generality and rigorosity) in [58, 30, 81, 38] . Among these, [30] and an unpublished longer version of [81] contain the earliest detailed execution models for cryptographic systems that we are aware of. Both are synchronous models. Problems such as the separation of users and adversaries, or defining runtime restrictions in the face of continuous external inputs, do not occur in the function-evaluation case, since function evaluation is non-reactive. A composition theorem for non-reactive simulatability was proven in [38] .
The idea of simulatability was subsequently also used for specific reactive problems, e.g., [55, 32, 44] , without a detailed or general definition. In a similar way it was used for the construction of generic solutions for large classes of reactive problems [57, 56, 61] (usually yielding inefficient solutions and assuming that all parties take part in all subprotocols). A reactive simulatability definition was first proposed (after some earlier sketches, in particular in [57, 90, 38] ) in [61] . It is synchronous, covers a restricted class of protocols (straightline programs with restricted operators, in view of the constructive result of this paper), and for the information-theoretic case only, where quantification over input sequences can be used instead of active honest users.
We first presented a synchronous version of a general reactive system model and reactive simulatability in [91] . The report version also contains further variants of the reactive simulatability definitions with proofs of equivalence or non-equivalence that are likely to carry over to the asynchronous case.
After that, and later but independently to the conference version [92] of the current paper, an asynchronous version of a general reactive model and reactive simulatability was also given in [39] . The model parts that were relatively well-defined seem to us a strict subset of our model: The system correspond to our "cryptographic systems with adaptive adversaries" in Section 6.3, always with polynomial-time users and adversaries. The entities are defined as Turing machines only, i.e., there is no explicit abstraction layer like our IO automata. The simulatability definition corresponds to the universal case of ours. Besides the model, the paper contains a composition theorem which was more general than ours at that time, while we had a property preservation theorem. Here the term UC (universal composability) was coined which is nowadays also widely used for the general idea of reactive simulatability or the definitions. (The paper also contains some sketches, while we had decided to only publish parts that we had actually defined and proved.)
The first rigorous model for reactive systems that covers cryptography, i.e., probabilistic and polynomial-time aspects, was presented in [73, 74] . It is based on π-calculus and uses formal language characterizations of polynomial time. The notion of security is observational equivalence. This is even stronger than reactive simulatability because the entire environment (corresponding to our users and adversary together) must not be able to distinguish the implementation and the specification. However, this excludes many abstractions, e.g., because a typical abstract specification is one machine and the real system is distributed with channel manipulation possibilities for the adversary, so that an adversary can already distinguish them by their structure. Correspondingly, the concrete specifications used essentially comprise the actual protocols including all cryptographic details. There was no tool support for the proofs at that time, as even the concrete specifications involved ad-hoc notations, e.g., for generating random primes.
Reductions as cryptographic proofs were introduced for cryptographic primitives in [35, 59, 100] . The best-known application to protocols is the handling of authentication protocols originating in [33] . Examples of later breaks of supposedly proven cryptographic systems are given in [89, 52, 63] .
The Dolev-Yao models underlying most proof tools for cryptographic protocols were introduced in [53] . Some important examples of their first use in different types of proof tools are [83, 80, 69, 77, 88, 97, 1] . Soundness of these models with respect to real cryptography was first considered in [2] , but only under passive attacks. This corresponds well to the fact that there wasn't even a definition for such a comparison under active attacks, and only reactive simulatability provided this later. Logics of belief for cryptographic protocol proofs were introduced in [36] . A semantics for such a model (in the sense of an execution semantics, still relying on a Dolev-Yao model for the cryptography) was first given in [3] . Careful study of this semantics shows that one needs hand-proofs of strong protocol properties before the logic applies; this is never done in practice. This is why we did not count breaks of protocols proven in such logics as counter-arguments against the Dolev-Yao models or proof tools relying on normal distributed-systems semantics.
IO automata were already used for security in [79] . There however, cryptographic systems are restricted to the usual equational specifications following a Dolev-Yao model [53] , and the semantics is not probabilistic. Only passive adversaries are considered and only one class of users, called environment. The author actually remarks that the model of what the adversary learns from the environment is not yet general, and that general theorems for the abstraction from probabilism would be useful. Our model solves these problems.
So far we looked at prior security definitions. We now consider literature on system models as such. Our IO automata are based on normal finite-state machines; deterministic and non-deterministic versions, also with infinite state, have been used widely throughout the distributed protocol literature. Probabilistic IO-automata and execution models for them are defined in [94, 78, 98] . There the order of events is chosen by a probabilistic scheduler that has full information about the system. However, this can give the scheduler too much power in a cryptographic scenario. In cryptology, the typical understanding of asynchronous systems, closest to a rigorous definition in [37] , is that the adversary schedules everything, but only with realistic information, in terms of both observations and computational capabilities. Recall that this is still an important special case in our model. We are sometimes asked why we do not just elaborate this case. However, there are situations where one definitely needs more benign scheduling or even some synchrony, as in our third special case (e.g., one may want to show liveness properties, but can only do so if one can model that messages are eventually delivered). As to local scheduling among system parts modeled as different automata but considered colocated, adversarial scheduling may often do no harm. However, having to prove it when one actually is considering a local situation, only defined as a composition, would just introduce unnecessary complications into the proof. Modeling only adversarial scheduling would remove the need to represent who schedules what, while the underlying model of asynchronous connections would remain the same. Problems with purely adversarial scheduling were already noted in [74] ; hence they schedule secure channels with uniform probability before adversary-chosen events. However, that introduces a certain amount of global synchrony. Furthermore, we do not require specific scheduling for all secure channels; they may be blindly scheduled by the adversary (i.e., without even seeing whether there are messages on the channel). For instance, this models the case where the adversary has a global influence on the relative network speed.
There are also probabilistic versions of other detailed distributed-systems frameworks than IO automata, but apart from [73, 74] we are not aware of a prior one with polynomial-time considerations or any specific scheduling considerations for security.
We are also not aware of any prior model with a representation of both honest users and adversaries.
Subsequent Work
As mentioned before, it has been shown that reactive simulatability has at least the properties expected of a refinement notion in distributed systems: First, it is indeed transitive [92] .
Secondly, it has a composition theorem that states that substituting a refined system (an implementation) for the original system (a specification) within a larger system is permitted [92] ; compositionality of reactive simulatability in different settings has been investigated in [39, 75, 24, 65, 51, 67, 70] . Thirdly, one can define computational versions of various security property classes and prove preservation theorems for them under reactive simulatability, in particular for integrity [91, 11] , key and message secrecy [19] , transitive and non-transitive noninterference [16, 15] , i.e., absence of information flow, and classes of liveness properties [22, 10] .
Various concrete cryptographic systems have been proven secure in the sense of reactive simulatability with respect to ideal specifications that are not encumbered with cryptographic details. This comprises secure message transmission [92, 46] , key exchange [46] , and group key agreement [96] . Under additional assumptions such as the existence of a common random reference string, this was extended to commitment schemes [43] , oblivious transfer [48, 54] , zeroknowledge proofs [43] , and, more generally, any multi-party function evaluation [48] . Reactive simulatability also proved useful for lower-layer proofs, e.g., of reactive encryption and signature security from traditional (non-reactive) encryption and signature security within [92, 40] and [41, 25, 26] , respectively, and of reactive Diffie-Hellman security within [96] .
A particularly important ideal specification that has been proven to have a cryptographic realization secure in the sense of reactive simulatability is a specific Dolev-Yao model [23, 27, 17, 21] , nowadays referred to as the BPW model. The BPW model offers a comprehensive set of Dolev-Yao-style operations for modeling and analyzing security protocols: both symmetric and asymmetric encryption, digital signatures, message authentication codes, as well as nonces, payload data and a list (pairing) operation. Proofs of the Needham-SchroederLowe protocol [14] , the Otway-Rees protocol [5] , the Yahalom protocol [20] , an electronic payment protocol [7] , and parts of public-key Kerberos [6] using the BPW model show that one can rigorously prove protocols based on this model in much the same way as with more traditional Dolev-Yao models. Weaker soundness notions for Dolev-Yao models such as integrity only or offline mappings between runs of the two systems, and/or allowing less general protocol classes, e.g., only a specific class of key exchange protocols, have been established in [82, 72, 45] . For these cases, simpler Dolev-Yao models and/or realizations can be used compared to [23] .
Establishing reactive simulatability for concrete systems has proven an error-prone task if approached rather informally, as it requires to carefully compare various behaviors of an ideal specification with corresponding behaviors of the concrete system. We emphasize that it is quite easy to guess almost correct ideal specifications of cryptography systems; the major part of the work lies in getting the details right and making a rigorous proof. Several abstractions presented with less detailed proofs have been broken [63, 9] (where the first paper attributes another such attack to Damgård). In order to establish reactive simulatability in a rigorous manner, the notion of a cryptographic bisimulation has been introduced in [23] and further extended in a sightly different framework in [42] . Cryptographic bisimulations are based on the notion of probabilistic bisimulations [71] , which capture that two systems that are in related states and receive the same input will yield identically distributed states and outputs after they performed their next transition. Cryptographic bisimulations extend this notion with imperfections and, in the case of the BPW model, an embedded static information-flow analysis.
As far as automation of security proofs in the context of reactive simulatability is concerned, it was first shown that automated proof tools can handle small examples of reactive simulatability proofs, based on the ideal specification of secure message transmission [12, 11] . Later it was shown that the BPW model is accessible to theorem proving techniques using the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [95] . This constitutes the first tool-supported framework for symbolically verifying security protocols that enjoys the strong cryptographic soundness guarantees provided by reactive simulatability. Fully automated techniques for proving secrecy properties of security protocols based on the BPW model have been invented in [13] using mechanized flow analysis. In the wider field of linking formal methods and cryptography, there is also work on formulating syntactic calculi for dealing with probabilism and polynomial-time considerations directly, in particular [84, 85, 68, 50, 34] . This is orthogonal to the work of justifying Dolev-Yao models: In situations where Dolev-Yao models are applicable and sound, they are likely to remain important because of the strong simplification they offer to the tools, which enables the tools to treat larger overall systems automatically than with the more detailed models of cryptography.
Finally, the expressiveness of reactive simulatability, i.e., the question which cryptographic tasks can be assigned a suitable ideal functionality under which assumptions, has been investigated in a series of papers. It has been shown that several cryptographic tasks cannot be proven secure in the sense of reactive simulatability unless one makes additional set-up assumptions, e.g., by postulating the existence of a common random reference string. Among these tasks are bit commitment, zero-knowledge proofs, oblivious transfer [43] , (authenticated) Byzantine agreement [76] , classes of secure multi-party computation protocols [47] , classes of functionalities that fulfill certain game-based definitions [49] , and Dolev-Yao style abstractions of XOR and hash functions [18, 28] . Other set-up assumptions to circumvent such impossibility results are to augment real and ideal adversaries with oracles that selectively solve certain classes of hard problems [93] , to free the ideal adversary from some of its computational restrictions [29] , or to impose constraints on the permitted honest users [8] . The price is either a narrower model tailored to a specific problem, sacrificing the transitivity of reactive simulatability and hence significantly complicating the modular construction of larger protocols, or providing only a limited form of compositionality.
Overview of this Paper
Section 2 introduces notation. Section 3 defines the general system model, i.e., machines, both their abstract version and their computational realization, and executions of collections of machines. Section 4 defines the security-specific system model, i.e., systems with users and adversaries. Section 5 defines reactive simulatability, i.e., our notion of secure refinement. Section 6 shows how to represent typical trust models, i.e., assumptions about the adversary, such as static threshold models and adaptive adversaries, with secure, authenticated and insecure channels. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Notation
Let Bool := {true, false}, and let N be the set of natural numbers and N 0 := N ∪ {0}. For an arbitrary set A, let P(A) denote its powerset. Furthermore, let A n denote the set of sequences over A with index set I = {1, . . . , n} for n ∈ N 0 , A * := n∈N 0 A n , and A ∞ the set of sequences over A with index set I = N. We write a sequence over A with index set I as S = (S i ) i∈I , where ∀i ∈ I : S i ∈ A. Let • denote sequence concatenation, and () the empty sequence. Let {()} denote the empty Cartesian product. For a sequence S ∈ A * ∪ A ∞ we define the following notation:
• For a function f : A → A ′ , let f (S) apply f to each element of S, retaining the order.
• Let size(S) denote the length of S, i.e., size(S) := |I| if I is finite, and size(S) := ∞ otherwise.
• For l ∈ N 0 , let S⌈ l (read "S restricted to l elements") denote the l-element prefix of S, and S[l] the l-th element of S with the convention that S[l] = ǫ if size(S) < l (for a fixed symbol ǫ). We sometimes write S l instead of S[l] to increase readability.
• For a predicate pred :
) denote the subsequence of S containing those elements S[i] of S with pred (S[i]) = true, retaining the order.
We lift the restriction notation to finite sequences of sequences:
In the following, we assume that a finite alphabet Σ ⊇ {0, 1, c, l, k} is given, where ∼ , !, ?, ↔ , ⊳ ∈ Σ. Then Σ * denotes the strings over Σ. Let ǫ be the empty string and Σ + := Σ * \{ǫ}. All notation for sequences can be used for strings, such as • for string concatenation, but • is often omitted.
For representing natural numbers and sequences of strings as strings, we assume a surjective function nat : Σ * → N with the convention nat(1) = 1, and a bijective function ι : (Σ * ) * → Σ * . We assume that standard operations are efficiently (polynomial-time) computable in these encodings; concretely we need this for inverting the function ι, for appending an element to a sequence of strings, and for retrieving and removing the nat(u)-th element from a sequence of strings.
For an arbitrary set A let Prob(A) denote the set of all finite probability distributions over A, i.e., those probability distributions D that are actually defined on a finite subset A ′ of A, augmented by D(A \ A ′ ) = 0. For a probability distribution D over A, the probability of a predicate pred : A → Bool is written Pr D (pred ). If x is a random variable over A with distribution D, we also write Pr D (pred (x)). In both cases we omit D if it is clear from the context.
We write := for deterministic and ← for probabilistic assignment. The latter means that for a function f : X → Prob(Y ), we write y ← f (x) to denote that y is chosen according to the distribution f (x). For such a function f we write y := f (x) if there exists y ′ ∈ Y with Pr f (x) (y ′ ) = 1. If the function f is clear from the context, we also write x → p y for Pr f (x) (y) = p, and → for → 1 . Furthermore, we sometimes treat f (x) as a random variable instead of a distribution, e.g., by writing Pr(f (x) = y) for Pr f (x) (y).
Asynchronous Reactive Systems
In this section, we define our model of interacting probabilistic machines with distributed scheduling and with computational realizations.
Ports
Machines can exchange messages with each other via ports. Intuitively, a port is a possible attachment point for a channel when a machine is considered in isolation. As in many other models, channels in collections of machines are specified implicitly by naming conventions on the ports; hence we define port names carefully. Figure 3 gives an overview of the naming scheme.
Definition 3.1 (Ports) Let P := Σ + × {ǫ, ↔ , ⊳ } × {!, ?}. Then p ∈ P is called a port. For p = (n, l, d) ∈ P, we call name(p) := n its name, label(p) := l its label, and dir(p) := d its direction. In the following we usually write (n, l, d) as nld, i.e., as string concatenation. This is possible without ambiguity, since the mapping ϕ :
The name of a port serves as an identifier and will later be used to define which ports are connected to each other. The direction of a port determines whether it is a port where inputs occur or where outputs are made. Inspired by the CSP [62] notation, this is represented by the symbols ? and !, respectively. The label becomes clear in Definition 3.3.
The label of a port determines the port's role in the upcoming scheduling model. Roughly, ports p with label(p) ∈ { ↔ , ⊳ } are used for scheduling whereas ports p with label(p) = ǫ are used for "usual" message transmission.
After introducing ports on their own, we now define the low-level complement of a port. Later each port and its low-level complement will be regarded as directly connected. Two connected ports have identical names and different directions. The relationship of their labels l and l ′ is visible in Figure 3 , i.e., l = l ′ = ⊳ or {l, l ′ } = {ǫ, ↔ }. The remaining notation of Figure 3 is explained below. In particular, "Buffer n" represents the network between the two simple ports n! and n?. If we are not interested in the network details then we regard the ports n! and n? as connected; thus we call them high-level complements of each other.
Machines
After introducing ports, we now define machines. Our primary machine model is probabilistic state-transition machines, similar to probabilistic I/O automata as in [94, 78] . A machine has a sequence of ports, containing both in-ports and out-ports, and a set of states, comprising sets of initial and final states. When a machine is switched, it receives an input tuple at its input ports and performs its transition function yielding a new state and an output tuple in the deterministic case, or a finite distribution over the set of states and possible outputs in the probabilistic case. Furthermore, each machine has state-dependent bounds on the length of the inputs accepted at each port to enable flexible enforcement of runtime bounds, as motivated in Section 1. The part of each input that is beyond the corresponding length bound is ignored. The value ∞ denotes that arbitrarily long inputs are accepted.
Definition 3.5 (Machines) A machine is a tuple
where
• Ports is a finite sequence of ports with pairwise distinct elements,
• States ⊆ Σ * is called a set of states,
• Ini , Fin ⊆ States are called the sets of initial and final states.
• l : States → (N 0 ∪ {∞}) |in(Ports )| is called a length function; we require l(s) = (0, . . . , 0) for all s ∈ Fin,
• δ is called a probabilistic state-transition function and defined as follows:
Let I := (Σ * ) |in(Ports )| and O := (Σ * ) |out(Ports )| denote the input set and output set of M, respectively. Then δ : States × I → Prob(States × O) with the following restrictions:
(The parts of each input beyond the length bound is ignored.)
3
In the following, we write name M for the name of machine M, Ports M for its sequence of ports, States M , Ini M , Fin M for its respective sets of states, I M , O M for its input and output set, l M for its length function and δ M for its transition function. The chosen representation makes the transition function δ independent of the port names; this enables port renaming in our proofs. The requirement for ǫ-inputs, i.e., the first restriction on δ, means that it does not matter if we switch a machine without inputs or not, i.e., there are no spontaneous transitions. The second restriction means that the part of each input beyond the current length bound for its port is ignored. In particular one can mask an input by a length bound 0 for a port. The restriction on l means that a machine ignores all inputs if it is in a final state, and hence it no longer switches.
We will often need the port set of a machine instead of its port sequence as well as the port set of an entire set of machines. 3
In the following, we define three disjoint types (subsets) of machines. Whether a machine is of one of these types depends only on its name and ports. All machines that occur in the following will belong to one of these types. Simple machines only have simple ports and clock out-ports, and their names are contained in Σ + . We do not make any restrictions on their internal behavior.
Definition 3.7 (Simple Machines
Similar to simple machines, default schedulers only have simple ports and clock out-ports, except that they have one special clock in-port clk ⊳ ?, called the default-clock in-port. For reasons of compatibility with existing papers based on the RSIM framework, we also introduce the terminology master scheduler and master-clock in-port to denote the default scheduler and the default-clock in-port, respectively. When we define the interaction of several machines, the default-clock in-port will be used to resolve situations where the interaction cannot proceed otherwise. A default scheduler makes no outputs (i.e., formally only empty outputs) in a transition that enters a final state. This will simplify the later definition that the entire interaction between machines stops if a default scheduler enters a final state.
• if Pr(δ M (s, I) = (s ′ , O)) > 0 with s ′ ∈ Fin M and arbitrary s ∈ States M and I ∈ I M , then O = (ǫ, . . . , ǫ).
3
If a simple machine or a default scheduler M has an out-port n! or an in-port n? we say that M is the sending machine or receiving machine for n, as shown in Figure 3 .
As the third machine set, we define buffers. All buffers have the same predefined transition function. They model the asynchronous channels between other machines, and will later be inserted between two ports n! and n? as shown in Figure 3 . More precisely, for each port name n, we define a buffer denoted as n with three ports n ⊳ ?, n ↔ ?, and n ↔ !. When a value is input at n ↔ ?, the transition function of the buffer appends this value to an internal queue over Σ * . An input u = ǫ at n ⊳ ? is interpreted as a natural number, captured by the function nat, and the nat(u)-th element of the internal queue is removed and output at n ↔ !. If there are less than nat(u) elements, the output is ǫ. As the two inputs never occur together in the upcoming run algorithm, we define that the buffer only evaluates its first non-empty input. Since the states have to be a subset of Σ * by Definition 3.5, we embed the queue into Σ * using the embedding function ι for sequences (see Section 2).
Definition 3.9 (Buffers) For every n ∈ Σ + we define a machine n called a buffer:
• l n (ι(P )) := (∞, ∞) for all ι(P ) ∈ States n , and • δ n (ι(P ), (u, v)) := (ι(P ′ ), (o)) deterministically as follows:
In the following, a machine with a tilde such as n always means the unique buffer for n ∈ Σ + according to Definition 3.9.
Computational Realization
For computational aspects, a machine M is regarded as implemented by a probabilistic interactive Turing machine as introduced in [60] . We need some extensions of this model of probabilistic interactive Turing machines. The main feature of interactive Turing machines is that they have communication tapes where one machine can write and one other machine can read. Thus we will use one communication tape to model each low-level connection. Probabilism is modeled by giving each Turing machine a read-only random tape containing an infinite sequence of independent, uniformly random bits. To make each Turing configuration finite, we can instead newly choose such a bit whenever a cell of the random tape is first accessed. Each Turing machine has one distinguished work tape; it may or may not have further local tapes, which are initially empty.
Our first extension concerns how the heads move on communication tapes; our choice guarantees that a machine can ignore the ends of long messages as defined by the length functions in our I/O machine model, and nevertheless read the following message. This helps machines to guarantee certain runtimes without becoming vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks by an adversary sending a message longer than this runtime. This enables liveness properties, although those are not considered in this paper. The second extension concerns restarts of machines in a multi-machine scenario. We guarantee that a switching step with only empty inputs is equivalent to no step at all, as in the I/O machine model.
By a Turing machine whose heads recognize partner heads we mean a Turing machine whose transition function has the following inputs: of course the finite state of the machine, and for each head of the machine, the content of the cell under this head and a bit denoting whether another head is on the same cell. 
3
The main reason to introduce a Turing-machine realization of the machine model is to define complexity notions. The interesting question is how we handle the inputs on communication tapes in the complexity definition, in particular for the notion of polynomial time, which is the maximum complexity allowed to adversaries against typical cryptographic systems.
One can imagine three degrees of an interactive machine being polynomial-time. The weakest would be that each M-transition only needs time polynomial in the current inputs and the current state, i.e., the current content of the local tapes. However, such a machine might double the size of its current state in each M-transition; then it would be allowed time exponential in an initial security parameter after a linear number of M-transitions. Hence we do not use this notion.
In the medium notion, which we call weakly polynomial-time, the runtime of the machine is polynomial in the overall length of its inputs, including the initial worktape content. Equivalently, the runtime for each M-transition is polynomial in the overall length of the inputs received so far. This makes the machine a permissible adversary when interacting with a cryptographic system which is in itself polynomially bounded. However, several weakly polynomialtime machines together (or even one with a self-connection) can become too powerful. E.g., each new output may be twice as long as the inputs so far. Then after a linear number of Mtransitions, these weakly polynomial-time machines are allowed time exponential in an initial security parameter. We nevertheless use weakly polynomial-time machines sometimes, because many functionalities are naturally weakly polynomial-time and not naturally polynomial-time in the following strong sense. However, one always has to keep in mind that this notion does not compose as we just saw.
Finally, polynomial-time machines are those who only need time polynomial in their initial worktape content, independent of all inputs on communication tapes.
A run of a probabilistic, interactive Turing machine is a valid sequence of configurations of T (defined as for other Turing machines), where the finite state end can only occur in the last configuration of the run.
Definition 3.11 (Complexity of Machines)
a) A probabilistic interactive Turing machine T is polynomial-time iff there exists a polynomial P such that all possible runs of T are of length at most P (k), i.e, take at most P (k) Turing steps, where k is the length of the initial worktape content. b) T is called weakly polynomial-time iff there exists a polynomial P such that for every fixed initial worktape content and fixed contents of all input tapes with overall length k ′ , all possible runs of T are of length at most P (k ′ ).
c) A machine M according to Definition 3.5 is (weakly) polynomial-time iff there exists a (weakly) polynomial-time probabilistic interactive Turing machine that implements M according to Definition 3.10.
More generally, if we say without further qualification that T fulfills some complexity measure, we mean that all possible runs of the machine fulfill this measure as a function of the length k of the initial worktape content. 3
Besides the deterministic runtime bounds that we have defined and that we will use in the following, one could define bounds for the expected runtime. Alternative definitions of polynomialtime specifically for reactive systems have recently been proposed [64, 70] , see [70] for a comparison. These definitions can be easily incorporated in the Reactive Simulatability framework.
Collections of Machines
After introducing individual machines, we now focus on collections of finitely many machines, with the intuition that these machines interact. Each machine in a collection must be uniquely determined by its name, and their port sets must be pairwise disjoint so that the naming conventions for low-and high-level complements will lead to well-defined one-to-one connections.
Definition 3.12 (Collections)
a) A collectionĈ is a finite set of machines with pairwise different machine names, pairwise disjoint port sets, and where each machine is a simple machine, a default scheduler, or a buffer.
b) A collection is called (weakly) polynomial-time iff all its non-buffer machines are (weakly) polynomial-time.
c) If n, M ∈Ĉ and n ⊳ ! ∈ ports(M) then we call M the scheduler for buffer n inĈ , and we omit "inĈ " if it is clear from the context.
3
If a port and its low-level complement are both contained in the port set of the collection, they form a low-level connection; recall Definition 3.4. High-level connections for simple ports are defined similarly. If a port p is contained in the port set of the collection but its low-level complement is not, p is called free. Free ports will later be used to connect external machines to the collection. For instance, a collection may consist of machines that execute a cryptographic protocol, and their free ports can be connected to users and an adversary. c) If p, p C ∈ ports(Ĉ ) then {p, p C } is called a high-level connection. The set Gr(Ĉ ) := {{p, p C } | p, p C ∈ ports(Ĉ )} is called the high-level connection graph ofĈ .
Given a collection of (usually simple) machines, we want to add buffers for all high-level connections to model asynchronous timing. This is modeled by the completion of a collectionĈ . The completion is the union ofĈ and buffers for all existing ports except the default-clock in-port. Note that completion leaves already existing buffers inĈ unchanged. A collection is called closed if the only free port of its completion is the default-clock in-port clk ⊳ ?. This implies that a closed collection has precisely one default scheduler, identified by having the unique default-clock in-port. a) The completion [Ĉ ] ofĈ is defined as 
Runs and their Probability Spaces
For a closed collection, we now define runs (in other terminologies executions or traces).
Informal Description
We start with an informal description. Machines switch sequentially, i.e., we have exactly one active machine M at any time. If this machine has clock out-ports, then besides its "normal" outputs, it can select the next message to be delivered by scheduling a buffer via one of these clock out-ports. If the selected message (i.e., a message at the selected position) exists in the buffer's internal queue, it is delivered by the buffer and the unique receiving machine becomes the next active machine. If M tries to schedule multiple messages, only one is taken, and if it schedules none or the message does not exist, the default scheduler X (which exists since we consider a closed collection) becomes active. Next we give a more precise, but still only semi-formal definition of runs. Runs and their probability spaces are defined inductively by the following algorithm for each tuple ini of initial states of the machines of a closed collectionĈ . The algorithm maintains variables for the states of all machines of the collection and treats each port as a variable over Σ * , initialized with ǫ except for clk ⊳ ? := 1. The algorithm further maintains a variable M CS ("current scheduler") over machine names, initialized with M CS := X, for the name of the currently active simple machine or default scheduler, and a variable r for the resulting run, an initially empty list. The algorithm operates in five phases, which are illustrated in Figure 4 . Probabilistic choices only occur in Phase 1. Whenever a machine (this may be a buffer) with name name M is switched from (s, I) to (s ′ , O), we add a step (name M , s, I, s ′ , O) to the run r with the following two restrictions. First, we cut each input according to the respective length function, i.e., we replace I by I ′ := I⌈ l M (s) . Secondly, we do not add the step to the run if I ′ = (ǫ, . . . , ǫ), i.e., if nothing happens in reality. This gives a family of probability distributions (runĈ ,ini ), one for each tuple ini of initial states of the machines of the collection. Moreover, for a setM of machines, we define the restriction of runs to those steps where a machine ofM switches. This is called the view ofM . Similar to runs, this gives a family of probability distributions (viewĈ ,ini (M )), one for each tuple ini of initial states.
Rigorous Definitions
We now define the probability space of runs rigorously. Since the semi-formal description is sufficient to understand our subsequent results and the rigorous definitions are quite technical, this subsection can be skipped at first reading.
We first define a global state space and a global transition function on these states. The global state space has five parts: the states of all machines of the collection, the current scheduler (currently active machine), a function assigning strings -the current values -to the ports of the collection, the current phase, and a subset of the out-port sequence of one machine for modeling the "for"-loop in the third phase of the informal algorithm. Additionally, the global state space contains a distinguished global final state s fin . • The set of global states ofĈ is defined as
• The set of initial global states ofĈ is defined as
with f (clk ⊳ ?) := 1 and f (p) := ǫ for p ∈ ports(Ĉ ) \ {clk ⊳ ?}.
3
On these global states, we define a global transition function. It reflects the informal run algorithm. Phase 1: Switch current scheduler.
where, with I := f (in(Ports M CS )) and O := f ′ (out(Ports M CS )),
Phase 2: Termination.
Phase 3: Store outputs.
where there exists n ∈ Σ + with
where f ′ (p) = ǫ for all p ∈ ports(Ĉ ) \ {clk ⊳ ?} and f ′ (clk ⊳ ?) = 1, and
, and
Phase 5: Deliver scheduled message.
where there exists o ∈ Σ + such that Rule (8) has only been included to define the function δ on the entire state space StatesĈ as claimed at the beginning of the definition. It will not matter in the execution since the previous state has to be in Phase 4, and this ensures that P contains exactly one clock port. Similarly, the other rules make no assumptions about reachable states. Furthermore, δ(s) is indeed an element of Prob(StatesĈ ) for every s ∈ StatesĈ : It is deterministic for all states s except those treated in Rule (1). For those, the claim follows immediately from the fact that δ M CS (s M CS , I) is a finite distribution. Given the global probabilistic transition function δ, we now obtain probability distributions on sequences of global states by canonical constructions as for Markov chains. This even holds for infinite sequences by the theorem of Ionescu-Tulcea; see, e.g., Section V.1 of [86] . More precisely, we obtain one such probability distribution for every global initial state. Applying the theorem of Ionescu-Tulcea to our situation yields the following lemma. for every sequence S = (S 1 , . . . , S i ) over StatesĈ with S 1 = ini , and Pr(S) = 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, for every sequence S ∈ States iĈ , let Rect(S) denote the corresponding rectangle of infinite sequences with this prefix, i.e., Rect(S) := {S ′ ∈ States ∞ C | S ′ ⌈ i = S}. Then there exists a unique probability distribution PStatesĈ ,ini,∞ over States ∞ C whose value for every rectangle R := Rect(S) with S ∈ States iĈ equals Pr(S), or more precisely,
We usually omit the indices "∞" and "i" of these distributions; this cannot lead to confusion. 2
Varying ini gives a family of probability distributions over States
; we write it
So far we have defined probabilities for sequences of entire global states. Each step in the runs introduced semi-formally above intuitively corresponds to the difference between two successive states: Moreover, only the switching of machines is considered in a run, i.e., the intermediate phases for termination checks and cleaning up scheduling are omitted, as well as the switching of machines with empty input (after application of the length function) because nothing happens then. We first define the set of possible steps, i.e., five-tuples containing the name of the currently switched machine M, its old state, its input tuple, its new state, and its output tuple. Furthermore, we define an encoding of steps as strings for the sole purpose of defining overall lengths of potential runs. Definition 3.17 (Steps) The set of steps is defined as
Let ι Steps : Steps → Σ + denote an efficient encoding from Steps into the non-empty strings over Σ. For all r = (r i ) i∈I ∈ Steps * let len(r) := i∈I size(ι Steps (r)), and for r ∈ Steps ∞ let len(r) := ∞.
3
In particular, we assume that the projection to the individual components of a step is efficiently computable. Now we define a mapping that extracts a run from a step sequence. Our definition first extracts a sequence of one potential step from each pair of a global state and the next one. This first part maps intermediate phases to steps with empty input tuples, so that it is then sufficient to restrict the obtained sequence to the elements with a non-empty input tuple for getting rid of both the intermediate phases and of actual switching with empty inputs. When extracting a potential step, we mainly distinguish whether the current scheduler switches or a buffer; such a buffer is always indicated by the first element in the port sequence of outputs still to be handled, the fifth element of the global state. 
. If i * := min{i ∈ N | s i = s fin } exists, let I := {1, . . . , i * − 2}, otherwise I := N. We define a sequence pot step(S) = ((n i , s i , I i , s ′ i , O i )) i∈I as follows. (Thus we already omit the last termination check.)
and O i := (ǫ).
• If P i = (), let p := P i [1] and p ∈ ports( n). Then -n i := n∼.
. . , ǫ)). For every number l ∈ N, let runĈ ,l denote the extraction of l-step prefixes of runs,
The run extraction is a random variable on every probability space over States ∞ C . For our particular probability space, this induces a family runĈ = (runĈ ,ini ) ini ∈IniĈ of probability distributions over Steps
for all r ∈ Steps * ∪ Steps ∞ , where run
is the set of pre-images of r. For a function l : IniĈ → N, this similarly gives a family of probability distributions
We finally introduce the view of a setM of machines in a collection. It is the restriction of a run (a sequence of steps) to those steps whose machine name belongs toM . The extraction function is independent of the collection, but we index it withĈ anyway for similarity with the run notation. For every number l ∈ N let viewĈ ,l (M ) denote the extraction of l-step prefixes of a view, i.e.,
For a singletonM = {M}, we write viewĈ (M) instead of viewĈ ({M }), and similar for l-step prefixes. Based on the family runĈ of probability distributions of runs, this induces a family of probability distributions
Finally, we define sets of state-traces and of traces (or step-traces). Intuitively, they are the possible sequences of global states and of steps, respectively. More precisely, each finite prefix of such a sequence happens with positive probability. • The set of state-traces for ini is
• The set of traces for ini is
• The set of possible views of a machine setM ⊆Ĉ for ini is
Set StateTraceĈ := ini∈IniĈ StateTraceĈ ,ini and TraceĈ := ini∈IniĈ TraceĈ ,ini and ViewTraceĈ (M ) := ini∈IniĈ ViewTraceĈ ,ini (M ).
We conclude this section with two properties of state-traces and views. The first, technical one states that whenever a non-buffer machine M is switched in a state-trace ofĈ , which only happens in Phase 1, there is at most one port p ∈ ports(Ĉ ) with a non-empty value, and it must fulfill p ∈ ports(M).
Lemma 3.2 (Unique Inputs in Traces)
LetĈ be a complete, closed collection. Let S := (S i ) i∈N ∈ StateTraceĈ where for each i ∈ N either S i = s fin or
Proof. For i = 1 this holds since S ∈ StateTraceĈ implies S 1 ∈ IniĈ and each element of IniĈ fulfills the claim with p = clk ⊳ !. Let now i > 1 and S i with j i = 1. Only two cases are possible for the previous state S i−1 . The case j i−1 = 4 and M i = X fulfills the claim for p = clk ⊳ ? ∈ ports(X), and the case j i−1 = 5 for p = n?.
The second property shows that the views of polynomial-time machines are polynomially bounded, and so are runs of polynomial-time collections. 
Then there exists a polynomial P such that for all ini ∈ IniĈ and all v ∈ ViewTraceĈ ,ini (M ) we have len(v) ≤ P (sizeM (ini)).
If the entire collectionĈ is polynomial-time, then there exists a polynomial P such that for all ini ∈ IniĈ and all r ∈ TraceĈ ,ini we have len(r) ≤ P (sizeĈ (ini )).
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Proof. By Definition 3.11, for a polynomial-time machine M, there exists a probabilistic interactive Turing machine T that implements M and only makes a polynomial number of Turing steps, relative to the length size(ini M ) of its own input, which is smaller than the overall input size sizeM (ini ) of the considered machines. Consequently, T and hence M can only build up a polynomial-size state and outputs, and read a polynomial-size part of its inputs. Each step in the view requires at least one Turing step; hence there is also only a polynomial number of these steps. Moreover, only states, outputs, and read parts of the inputs are part of the steps (see Definitions 3.16 and 3.18) . This proves the first statement.
A run of a polynomial-time collectionĈ consists of the steps of its polynomial-time machines and its buffers. Buffers are not polynomial-time, but weakly polynomial-time; this follows immediately from the assumption we made about the encoding ι of the internal queue. Each buffer obtains all its inputs from polynomial-time machines; hence its overall input is of polynomial length. Thus each buffer only makes a polynomial number of Turing steps. This yields an overall polynomial size of its steps as above.
Security-Specific System Model
Security-specific structures are defined as collections of machines with distinguished service ports for the honest users, as explained in the introduction. Such structures are augmented by arbitrary machines H and A representing the honest users and the adversary, who can interact. We then speak of a configuration. For configurations, we also introduce specific families of executions corresponding to different security parameters for cryptographic aspects. Forbidden ports for users of a structure are those that clash with port names of given machines and those that would link the user to a non-service port.
A system is a set of structures. The idea behind systems, as motivated in the introduction, is that there may be different actual structures depending on the set of actually malicious participants. Typical derivations of systems from one explicitly defined intended structure and a trust model will be discussed in Section 6. A configuration consists of a structure together with a user machine and an adversary machine (or user and adversary for short). The user is restricted to connecting to the service ports. The adversary closes the collection, i.e., it connects to the remaining service ports, to the other free portsSM of the collection, and to the free ports of the user. Thus, user and adversary can interact, e.g., for modeling active attacks. b) The set of configurations of (M , S ) is written Conf(M , S ). The set of configurations of (M , S ) with polynomial-time user H and adversary A is written Conf poly (M , S ).
c) The set of configurations of a system Sys is defined as Conf(Sys) := (M ,S )∈Sys Conf(M , S ), and similarly Conf poly (Sys) := (M ,S )∈Sys Conf poly (M , S ).
We omit the index "poly" from Conf poly (Sys) if it is clear from the context. 3
In cryptographic applications, all machines typically start with the same security parameter. An informal description of runs and views of configurations based on the informal description of runs and views of collections from Section 3.5 is thus simply obtained by restricting the tuple ini of initial states. For reasons of rigor, we define runs and views of configurations based on the rigorous definitions of global states, runs, and views of collections from Section 3.5 by making a global constraint on the valid global initial states in the family of runs of a configuration that the security parameters are equal. 
IniĈ with X and f as in Definition 3.15. Then we define the family of probability distributions of runs of the configuration as
and for all setsM ′ ⊆Ĉ the family of probability distributions of views similarly
and analogously for l-step prefixes. Furthermore, we identify Ini conf with N and thus write run conf ,k etc. for the individual probability distributions in the families. 3
Reactive Simulatability
Reactive simulatability, our notion of secure refinement, is defined for individual structures and lifted to entire systems. Two structures struc 1 and struc 2 can be compared if they have the same service ports, so that the same honest users can connect to them. In other words, they offer the same interface for the design of a larger system, so that either struc 1 or struc 2 can be plugged into that system. Now struc 1 is considered at least as secure as struc 2 , written struc 1 ≥ struc 2 , if whatever any adversary A 1 can do to any honest user H using struc 1 , some adversary A 2 can do to the same H using struc 2 essentially with the same probability. More precisely, the families of views of H in these two configurations are indistinguishable. Different variants of indistinguishability are based on different classes of small functions (occurring as differences). The most important class is that of negligible functions; additionally we define closure properties that we require of suitable classes of small functions. b) statistically indistinguishable ("≈ SMALL ") for a suitable class SMALL of small functions iff the distributions are discrete and their statistical distances, as a function of k, are small, i.e.,
c) computationally indistinguishable ("≈ poly ") iff for every algorithm Dis (the distinguisher) that is probabilistic polynomial-time in its first input,
(Intuitively, Dis, given the security parameter and an element chosen according to either var k or var ′ k , tries to guess which distribution the element came from.)
We write ≈ if we want to treat all cases together. 3
Note that for countable D k , statistical indistinguishability can be rewritten in the more common form of requiring (
We now present the reactive simulatability definition. One technical problem is that a user might legitimately connect to the service ports in a configuration of (M 1 , S ), but in a configuration of (M 2 , S ) the same user might have forbidden ports. This is excluded by considering suitable configurations only. 
As we have three different notions of indistinguishability, our reactive simulatability definition also comes in three flavors. Furthermore, we distinguish the general reactive simulatability (GRSIM) as sketched so far and a stronger universal version (URSIM) where one adversary A 2 must be able to work for all users. Note that the term "reactive simulatability" is primarily meant to capture the overall idea of suitably comparing the views of honest users when interacting with reactive protocols; in follow-up papers, reactive simulatability is sometimes also used as a synonym for general reactive simulatability.
Definition 5.4 (General/Universal Reactive Simulatability for Structures) Let structures (M 1 , S ) and (M 2 , S ) with identical sets of service ports be given.
, spoken perfectly at least as secure as, iff for every configuration S ) for a suitable class SMALL of small functions, spoken statistically at least as secure as, iff for every configuration conf 1 
, spoken computationally at least as secure as, iff for every con-
poly (M 1 , S ), there exists a configuration conf 2 = (M 2 , S , H, A 2 ) ∈ Conf poly (M 2 , S ) (with the same H) such that
In all three cases, we speak of universal reactive simulatability (URSIM) if A 2 in conf 2 does not depend on H (only onM 1 , S , and A 1 ), and we use the notation ≥ uni,perf sec etc. for this. In all cases, we call conf 2 an indistinguishable configuration for conf 1 .
There is also a notion of blackbox reactive simulatability (BRSIM), where the adversary A 2 consists of a fixed part, called simulator, using A 1 as a blackbox submachine. However, its rigorous definition needs the notion of machine combination, which we postpone to the successor paper dealing with composition. If one can simply set A 2 := A 1 , we also say that the structures are observationally equivalent, or simply indistinguishable; this corresponds to the definition in [73] .
Where the difference between the types of security is irrelevant, we simply write ≥ sec , and we omit the index sec if it is clear from the context. Remark 5.1. Adding a free adversary out-port in the comparison (like the guessing-outputs used to define semantic security of encryption systems in [59] ), thus taking the view of the adversary into account, does not make the definition stricter since the universal quantification over the honest user and the adversary could always be exploited to provide information that the adversary knows to the honest user: Any such out-port can be connected to an in-port added to the honest user with sufficiently large length bounds. H does not react on inputs at this new in-port, but nevertheless it is included in the view of H, i.e., in the comparison. A rigorous proof can be found in [4] .
•
The definition of general and universal reactive simulatability can be lifted from structures to systems Sys 1 and Sys 2 by comparing their respective structures. However, we do not want to compare a structure of Sys 1 with arbitrary structures of Sys 2 , but only with certain "suitable" ones. What suitable means in a concrete situation can be defined by a mapping f from Sys 1 to the powerset of Sys 2 . The mapping f is called valid if it maps structures with the same set of service ports, so that the same user can connect. 
Sys 2 for a suitable class SMALL of small functions, spoken statistically at least as secure as, iff for every
Sys 2 , spoken computationally at least as secure as, iff for every
In all three cases, we speak of universal reactive simulatability if the respective relation on structures fulfills universal simulatability, and we use the notation ≥ f,uni,perf sec etc. for this. 3
Where the difference between the types of security is irrelevant, we simply write ≥ sec , and we again omit the index sec if it is clear from the context.
We conclude this section with two technical lemmas capturing an equivalent definition of the forbidden ports of a structure and additional results on valid mappings and suitable configurations, which is useful in proofs.
Recall that Definition 4.4 excludes users that would connect to the forbidden ports of a configuration. The following lemma establishes an equivalent condition. The following lemma shows that the ports of a structure that users are intended to use, i.e., the complement of the service ports, are not at the same time forbidden. Moreover, it shows that a non-suitable configuration can be transformed into a suitable one via port renaming such that this renaming does not affect the view of the user. This means that the restriction to suitable configurations in the definition of reactive simulatability is without loss of generality. 
Chosen-message attacks etc.
Machines Adversary clk ? S Figure 5 : Derivation of one possible structure from an intended structure. The structures are the black parts.
For Part b), we want to construct H f by giving each port p = nld ∈ ports(H) ∩ forb(M 2 , S ) a new name. Since runs and views do not depend on port names, cf. Definition 3.5, they remain the same if we consistently rename all other ports q (at most five) with name(q) = n. The new collection is a configuration (M 1 , S , H f , A f,1 ) if no renamed port belongs toM 1 
. Now Lemma 5.1 implies p c ∈ S , hence Part a) applied to the structure (M 2 , S ) implies p ∈ forb(M 2 , S ), in contradiction to the original condition on p.
Special Cases for Cryptographic Purposes
In the presence of adversaries, the structure of correct machines running may not be the intended structure that the designer originally planned. For instance, some machines might have been corrupted; hence they are missing from the actual structure and the adversary took over their connections. We model this by defining a system as a set of possible actual structures. A system is typically derived automatically from an intended structure and a trust model. We define this for static and adaptive adversaries, arbitrary access structures limiting the corruption capabilities of an adversary, and different channel types. While one typically considers all basic channels insecure in a security protocol, secure or authentic channels are useful to model initialization phases, e.g., the assumption that a public-key infrastructure exists. In contrast to some formal methods which immediately abstract from cryptography, we cannot represent this by a fixed initial key set because we need probabilities over the key generation for security; moreover, this would not allow a polynomial number of keys to be chosen reactively.
Cryptographic systems come in two flavors, depending on how the adversary takes control over certain machines. If malicious machines are malicious from the beginning, we call the system a static standard cryptographic system. If the adversary may corrupt machines during the protocol executions, depending on the knowledge that he has already collected, we speak of an adaptive standard cryptographic system.
Trust Models and Intended Structures
We start with the definition of trust models for a structure. Trust models consist of two parts: an access structure and a channel model. Access structures will later be used to denote the possible sets of correct machines in an intended structure. Access structures have to be closed under insertion, i.e., with every such set, every larger set is contained as well.
Definition 6.1 (Access Structure) Let A be an arbitrary set. Then ACC ⊆ P(A) is called an access structure for A iff (B ∈ ACC ∧ C ∈ P(A) ∧ B ⊆ C ) ⇒ C ∈ ACC for all sets B and C . 3
Typical examples of access structures are threshold structures ACC t,n := {H ⊆ A | |H| ≥ t} with t ≤ n. A channel model for a structure classifies each internal high-level connection as secure (private and authentic), authenticated (only authentic), or insecure (neither private nor authentic), represented as elements of the set {s, a, i}. What this means will become clear in Section 6.2. We proceed with the definition of intended structures, i.e., structures a designer of a security protocol would typically design. An intended structure is a structure that is benign in the sense that it does not offer any free simple ports for the adversary. Moreover, we demand that a machine of a structure may only schedule those connections for which it owns the corresponding input or output port, i.e., it does not intend to schedule users and adversaries. We distinguish three different kinds of intended structures, depending on how the channels between the system and the user are clocked. We call the structure localized if every output is clocked by the outputting machine itself. Structures of this kind are typically used as local submachines that can be clocked by the overall protocol and then immediately deliver a result. If the adversary clocks the communication between the structure and the user, we call the structure stand-alone. Finally, if the user and the system have to fetch the outputs of the other, we call the structure fetching.
Remark 6.1. We could as well distinguish channels from the user to the system and vice versa, e.g., to define that users schedule their outputs and fetch their inputs. This would give nine different combinations. Modifying the upcoming definition of intended structures in such a way is trivial.
The derivation of the remaining structures based on the intended structure will rely on modifying the connections in an adequate way, e.g., by duplicating output ports that output on authentic channels so that one output port is connected as usual and the duplicated port is connected to the adversary. Hence derived structures need an extended set of possible port names. Moreover, we will need a distinguished state and distinguished ports to model adaptive corruptions of machines. Technically, we therefore parameterize intended structures by an additional alphabet Γ Σ with |Γ| = |Σ| − 2 and a state s corr , and we restrict port names in the intended structure to Γ + and possible states to Σ * \ {s corr }.
Definition 6.4 (Intended Structure) A structure (M * , S * ) is called an intended structure for s corr ∈ Σ * and Γ ⊂ Σ with |Γ| = |Σ| − 2 iff
• all M ∈M * are simple, name(p) ∈ Γ + for all p ∈ ports(M * ), and s corr ∈ States M for all M ∈M * ,
• for all M ∈M * : (n ⊳ ! ∈ ports(M) ⇒ (n? ∈ ports(M)) ∨ (n! ∈ ports(M))), and
• it has the following properties. Let
-The structure is called localized iff
and the following condition on the port set ofM * holds:
#M * schedules its outputs to the user -The structure is called stand-alone iff S * = S ′ and
# between the user andM * -The structure is called fetching iff
* schedules the inputs from the user 3
Standard Static Cryptographic Systems
Standard static cryptographic systems are derived from an intended structure and a trust model as follows. Each system contains one structure for each element of the considered access structure, i.e., for each set H of potential correct machines. The channel model is taken into account as follows. Intuitively, we change the connections such that the adversary receives messages sent on authenticated and insecure channels, and we enable him to arbitrarily modify messages sent on insecure channels. This is modeled as depicted in Figure 6 for authenticated and insecure channels; secure channels remain unchanged. Authenticated channels are modeled by additional out-ports p d ! where outputs at p! are duplicated. The port p d ! remains free; hence the adversary can connect to it. Insecure channels are modeled by renaming the input port. This breaks the existing connection and places the adversary in between.
Moreover, if p? belongs to a correct machine and p! does not, we also rename p? into p a ? so that all inputs from the adversary have superscript a. By applying these changes to a machine M, we get a modified machine M H,χ .
Formally, let {a, d} := Σ \ Γ. Then we define two mappings ϕ a and ϕ d that assign each port p = (n, l, d) with n ∈ Γ + ports (an, l, d) and (dn, l, d) respectively. We write p a and p d instead of ϕ a (p) and ϕ d (p).
We now define the derivation of static cryptographic systems from a given intended structure and a trust model rigorously. Similar to the definition of runs, the semi-formal description given above is sufficient to understand our subsequent results, so the following technical definition can be skipped at first reading.
Definition 6.5 (Derivation of Standard Static Cryptographic Systems) Let (M * , S * ) be an intended structure for a state s corr and a set Γ, and let (ACC, χ) be a trust model for (M * , S * ). Then the corresponding cryptographic system with static adversary
is Sys := {(M H , S H ) | H ∈ ACC} where for all H ∈ ACC:
• S H := S * ∩ free([H]).
• 
Standard Cryptographic Systems with Adaptive Adversaries
Standard static cryptographic systems as defined in the previous section are based on the intuition that corrupted machines are corrupted right from the start, e.g., they belong to untrusted owners. In adaptive (or dynamic) adversary models the set of corrupted machines can increase over time, e.g., because there is a "master adversary" who has to hack into machines in order to corrupt them [31, 38] . Adaptive adversary models are more powerful than static ones, i.e., there are examples of systems secure against static adversaries that are insecure against adaptive adversaries who can corrupt the same number of machines [38] .
For a given intended structure and a channel model, the corresponding cryptographic system with adaptive adversary has only one structure. Similar to the derivation of static cryptographic systems from an intended structure, we define the derivation of a machine M corr,χ from each machine M. This derivation is used to grant the adversary the possibility to corrupt machines during the global execution. This is modeled by giving M corr,χ a corruption port corrupt Mcorr,χ ?, which is used for corruption requests, and two new ports cor out Mcorr,χ !, cor in Mcorr,χ ? for communication with the adversary after corruption. We assume that these ports must neither occur in an intended structure nor after port renaming as defined for the static case; this can be achieved by encoding the names of these ports into Σ + \ ({ǫ, a, d} • Γ + ) where Σ = Γ ∪ {a, d}. The corruption port must connect to the service ports. Upon a non-empty input at the corruption port, M corr sends its current state to the adversary via cor out Mcorr,χ !, and from now on acts transparently, i.e., every input (I 1 , . . . , I s ) is translated into the output ι(I 1 , . . . , I s ) at cor out Mcorr,χ !, and every input (b) at cor in Mcorr,χ ? is first decomposed as (O 1 , . . . , O t ) := ι −1 (b) and then output at the respective output ports. Definition 6.7 (Derivation of Standard Adaptive Cryptographic Systems) Let (M * , S * ) be an intended structure for a state s corr and a set Γ, and let χ be a channel model χ for (M * , S * ). Then the corresponding cryptographic system with adaptive adversary
is Sys := {(M , S )} where
•M := {M corr,χ | M ∈M * }, where M corr,χ is derived from M with H =M as follows: Let M H,χ be the machine defined in the static case (Definition 6.5). Then Note that M corr,χ is not polynomial-time. Explicitly bounding the number of bits read in a corrupted state independent of the adversary does not capture our intuition of a machine that acts transparently for any adversary, and an explicit bound would severely limit the adversary's capabilities. The fundamental problem is that transparent machines are by definition not polynomial-time but only weakly polynomial-time.
Several extensions are possible: One may extend the corruption responses to two classes of storage, an erasable and a non-erasable one, e.g., to model the different vulnerability of session keys and long-term keys. This means to refine the state spaces of each machine as a Cartesian product. Inputs and outputs would be treated like erasable storage. One can also model non-binary corruption requests, e.g., stop requests and requests to corrupt different classes of storage. To model proactive systems [87] , one needs repair requests in addition to corruption requests, and appropriate repair responses, e.g., returning to an initial state with only a certain class of storage still intact.
Summary
We have presented a rigorous model for secure reactive systems with cryptographic parts in asynchronous networks. Common types of cryptographic systems and their trust models were expressed as special cases of this model, in particular systems with static or adaptive adversaries and with different types of underlying channels. We have defined reactive simulatability as a notion of refinement that retains not only integrity properties but also confidentiality.
As design principles based on this model, we propose to keep specifications of cryptographic systems abstract, i.e., free of all implementation details and deterministic unless the desired functionality is probabilistic by nature, e.g., a common coin-flipping protocol. This allows the cryptographically verified abstractions to be used as building blocks for systems that can be subjected to formal verification. Suitable abstractions sometimes have to explicitly include tolerable imperfections of systems, e.g., leakage of the length of encrypted messages or abilities of the adversary to disrupt protocol runs. In subsequent work, we already showed multiple desired properties of reactive simulatability, in particular composition and property-preservation theorems. We also proved several building blocks like secure message transmission and a Dolev-Yaostyle cryptographic library with nested operations. Moreover, we demonstrated the applicability of formal methods over our model by small examples.
